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COMMONSENSE, SKEPTICAL THEISM,  
AND DIFFERENT SORTS OF CLOSURE OF  
INQUIRY DEFEAT
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge
Trent Dougherty argues (contra Jonathan Matheson) that when taking into 
consideration the probabilities involving skeptical theism (ST) and gratuitous 
evils, an agent may reasonably affirm both ST and that gratuitous evils exist. 
In other words, Dougherty thinks that assigning a greater than .5 probability 
to ST is insufficient to defeat the commonsense problem of evil. I argue that 
Dougherty’s response assumes, incorrectly, that ST functions solely as an evi-
dential defeater, and that, when understood as a closure of inquiry defeater, 
ST may still defeat reasonable belief in gratuitous evils, even in the face of 
strong evidence that gratuitous evils exist.
In this paper, I argue that whenever an agent S assigns a credence greater 
than .5 to skeptical theism, then S likely has a defeater for reasonably 
believing that there are gratuitous evils on the basis of an evil which seems 
gratuitous to S, even if the proposition that there are gratuitous evils re-
mains on-balance probable1 for S. Or to put it more loosely, when skeptical 
theism is more probable than not for S, then S will not be able to rationally 
believe that there are gratuitous evils, even if her evidence on-balance 
supports the existence of gratuitous evils. In order to see how this could 
be the case, we must diligently keep separate our epistemology of belief 
from our understanding of the nature of evidence. When we accomplish 
this, it becomes much easier to see how the notion of defeat functions 
differently within each domain.2
I proceed as follows. In §1, I introduce the background themes of an 
ongoing debate between Trent Dougherty and Jonathan Matheson con-
cerning the following thesis: someone who assigns a credence greater 
than .5 to skeptical theism cannot consistently endorse the commonsense 
argument from evil against the existence of God. Matheson affirms this 
thesis while Dougherty dissents. Before entering into the debate itself, 
1A terminological note: I take evidential relations to be, at bottom, logical probabi-
listic relations holding between propositions. As a result, I use the terms “evidential” and 
“probabilistic” as interchangeable terms of art throughout. I also use “belief” and “assent” 
interchangeably, but clarity in the article is not, I think, compromised.
2Cf. Foley, Working Without a Net.
pp. 17–32 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 34 No. 1 January 2017
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201712576
All rights reserved
18 Faith and Philosophy
however, it will be necessary to engage in a bit of scene-setting, including 
developing the commonsense problem of evil, which allegedly renders 
skeptical theism powerless. In §2, I introduce Matheson’s argument, along 
with the notion of a fully undercutting defeater, that skeptical theism can 
indeed serve as a response to the commonsense problem of evil so long as 
it is wedded to a plausible theory of epistemic defeat. Then in §3 I expand 
on Dougherty’s reply to Matheson. What we learn in this section is that 
Dougherty’s complaint concerning Matheson’s argument fundamentally 
spawns from a dissatisfaction with Matheson’s theory of epistemic defeat. 
That theory does not accommodate the obvious need for partial evidential 
defeaters, which at least in some cases, can be used to demonstrate that 
the thesis under dispute (i.e., that someone cannot rationally assign a 
credence greater than .5 to both skeptical theism and the existence of gra-
tuitous evils) is false.3
My own discontentment with the work of the above authors springs 
from a similar worry; namely, that their theories of epistemic defeat are, 
at least, incomplete. In §4, then, I present a different sort of epistemic 
defeater—a closure of inquiry undercutting defeater—that I think better 
establishes the conclusion at which Matheson aims; namely, that when 
someone thinks skeptical theism is more likely than not, then they cannot 
rationally affirm the existence of gratuitous evil. My view, in brief, is that 
there are non-evidential, but still epistemic, defeaters which can undermine 
reasonable belief. The probabilistic defeaters in play between Dougherty 
and Matheson, however, are merely evidential defeaters, and so, if the 
relevant sort of defeat would better be construed as a non-evidential clo-
sure of inquiry defeater, then even the probability function of the agent 
described by Dougherty (in §3) will not suffice for reasonable belief in 
the existence of gratuitous evils. Finally, in §5, I attempt to motivate the 
existence closure of inquiry defeaters and their applicability to the debate 
under question.
1. The Debate—Commonsense Epistemology and Skeptical Theism
Commonsense epistemologists endorse various theses, depending on the 
particular philosopher, all of which bear a family resemblance to each 
other in virtue of awarding some degree of positive epistemic status to 
individual-centric seemings. One such thesis, Phenomenal Conservatism 
(PC), is a paradigmatic token of this thesis-type.
PC: If it seems to S that p, then S is prima facie justified in believing p.4
3Rebutting defeaters are not going to be relevant to the discussion above. As I prefer 
to construe a rebutting defeater, dR is a rebutting defeater for p if it is evidence for ¬p. See 
Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge and Pollock and Gillies, “Belief Revision and 
Epistemology.”
4See Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, for a defense of this principle. Also see 
Tucker, Seemings and Justification for an extensive discussion of the proper formulation and 
viability of similar principles, including an in-depth analysis of such objections as the cogni-
tive penetration problem (225–289). 
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Skeptical theism (ST) claims that our cognitive capacities give out, fail 
to fully capture, or run out of steam when faced with judgments con-
cerning the landscape of all-things-considered value and its connection 
with seemingly gratuitous suffering encountered in the world. That is, 
skeptical theists claim,
ST: Human agents simply aren’t in a position to determine how likely 
or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently gratuitous evil is 
actually gratuitous.5
Skeptical theists then go on to claim that the truth of ST undercuts the 
crucial inference in the evidential problem of evil from “there are no pos-
sible reasons of which we are aware that would justify God in permitting 
that evil” to “there are no possible reasons that would justify God in per-
mitting that evil.” This inference is known as a “noseeum inference,”6 and 
ST tells us that the noseeum inference at issue in the problem of evil falters 
due to the possibly unrepresentative nature of our experiences of appar-
ently gratuitous suffering. That is, it would be wholly unsurprising were 
such apparent gratuitousness largely misleading concerning the actual 
gratuitousness of the evils in the world.
The tension between PC and ST, however, becomes obvious at this 
point. Suppose that S, rather than indirectly inferring that some evil is 
unjustified due to her inability to see any reasons for permitting that 
(token) evil (i.e., by noseeum inference), were to appeal directly to PC and 
claim, “that evil seems unjustified” (henceforth, I refer to this claim which 
reappears throughout as “O”). Then since as originally construed7 ST only 
applies to noseeum inferences, it would fail as a response to this sort of 
direct attack against theism.8 In such a case, PC would confer immediate 
prima facie justification on the belief that evil is unjustified9 (henceforth, I 
refer to this claim as “P1”). So unless the truth of ST, or belief in ST, is suf-
ficient to defeat the prima facie justification for belief in P1 without relying 
on the presence of a noseeum inference, then PC’s truth will in some cases 
ground (for some individuals) a very powerful and rationally held version 
of the evidential problem of evil.
5The following represent some prominent skeptical theists who would endorse ST: van 
Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air and the Problem of Silence”; Bergmann, 
“Commonsense Skeptical Theism”; and Rea, “Skeptical Theism and the ‘Too Much Skepti-
cism’ Objection.” 
6Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering” gives us the 
name on the basis of a small insect in the Midwest region of the US called a “noseeum.” 
7The attentive reader will notice that ST is formulated in such a way that it can deal 
with the sort of direct attack I discuss in the text. However, earlier versions of ST were 
utilized to undermine inferences, which is my reason for including the qualifier “as origi-
nally construed” in the text above. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out 
to me.
8Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism.”
9I’m using “unjustified” and “gratuitous” interchangeably here. Nothing hinges on this.
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2. ST as a Fully Undercutting Defeater (Matheson)
Jonathan Matheson has recently defended the view, following Michael 
Bergmann, that ST can indeed defeat the reasonability of belief in P1 
on the basis of O, and he accomplishes this by supplementing ST with 
a particular theory of epistemic defeat according to which ST functions 
as a fully undercutting evidential defeater.10 This type of defeater can be 
understood as follows. Let e be one’s evidence for proposition p, such that 
the probability of p given e is greater than the probability of p on one’s 
background knowledge alone (i.e., Pr[p|e] > Pr[p]).11 If this probabilistic 
relationship holds, then let us say that e evidentially supports p. A proposi-
tion dfull , then, will be a fully undercutting evidential defeater if it calls into 
question this evidential support relation such that the probability of p 
given the conjunction of e and d reverts to the probability of p on one’s 
background knowledge alone (i.e., Pr[p|e & dfull] = Pr[p]).
In addition to the above condition for a fully undercutting defeater, 
Matheson claims that the amount of prima facie justification conferred on 
some target proposition, p, by a seeming for S can be undercut by d so long 
as S is on-balance justified (i.e., would assign a greater than .5 credence) in 
believing d, even if d is overall less justified than p for S. Consider Mathe-
son’s own illustration:
Smith has been accused of a crime, and you are aware of some, but not 
all, of the evidence against Smith. You are then told that the evidence you 
have is just as likely to be representative of the total evidence as it is likely 
to be unrepresentative. Suppose further that you reflect on this evidence 
and it strongly seems to you that Smith is guilty, and given PC, you thereby 
acquire prima facie justification for believing Smith is guilty. But you are 
also on-balance justified in believing that your evidence is as likely repre-
sentative of the total evidence as it is unlikely. Thus, your seeming is fully 
undercut by these considerations concerning the representativeness of 
your evidence sample, and this is true, even if the seeming resulted in a 
.9 credence of Smith’s guilt when you were only, say, .6 confident of your 
ignorance concerning the sample’s representativeness.12
Thus, Matheson’s point is clearly this: he thinks that whenever someone 
is on-balance justified in believing an undercutting defeater, then this 
defeater fully undercuts the epistemic support relation at which it is di-
rected.13 And this will remain true, even if the justification conferred on 
10He defends this thesis in two places. See Matheson, “Epistemological Considerations 
Concerning Skeptical Theism: a Response to Dougherty” and “Phenomenal Conservatism 
and Skeptical Theism.”
11I’ve suppressed the typical “k” or “b” for background knowledge for readability above.
12See Matheson, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism,” 8, for the full case. I 
paraphrase his discussion for the sake of brevity.
13A clarification brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer: The phrase “at 
which it is directed” is important since it is possible for there to be multiple lines of evidence 
(i.e., multiple evidential support relations) concerning a proposition. Consequently, if the 
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p by e (i.e., the evidential seeming) is greater than one’s justification for 
believing the undercutting defeater. To see how this works in the case of 
skeptical theism, recall the following propositions:
O: That evil seems gratuitous.
P1: That evil is gratuitous.
ST: Human agents simply aren’t in a position to determine how likely 
or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently gratuitous evil is 
actually gratuitous.
Suppose an agent assigns ST a probability of .6, and suppose further 
that the evidential support conferred on P1 by O for this agent is initially 
.9. Matheson is claiming this: assuming that the agent under question is 
aware that ST is a defeater for the evidential connection between O and P1, 
then she will be irrational if she continues to believe P1 on the basis of O, 
for that evidential basis is fully undermined by ST. Of course, the success 
of Matheson’s argument depends on the plausibility of his theory of un-
dercutting defeat, a theory which, I think, cannot stand up against critical 
scrutiny. Let us, then, turn to an alternative understanding of epistemic 
defeat which includes the possibility of partially undercutting defeaters for 
cases such as the one above.
3. Partial Evidential Defeat and Running the Probabilities (Dougherty)
In a series of two articles,14 Trent Dougherty responds to Matheson’s theory 
of defeat and argues that it fails to accommodate our intuitions in cases of 
epistemic defeat. First, Dougherty points to a natural intuition concerning 
the relationship between one’s comparative confidences in P1 and ST.
[N]ote that the more convinced you were that your moral intuition about 
the intrinsic impermissibility of some particularly horrendous evil was ac-
curate [i.e., P1], the more this would call into question the accuracy of your 
intuition that the skeptical theses were true [i.e., ST].15
Thus what Dougherty suggests, contrary to what we’ve seen Matheson 
claim, is that the degree of confidence we assign to P1 ought to increase as 
our degree of confidence in ST decreases (i.e., they are inversely related). 
And this is contrary to Matheson because on his view a decrease in one’s 
degree of confidence in ST will affect the degree of confidence one as-
signs to P1 only when the credence given to ST falls below the threshold 
evidential support relation between e and p is defeated by an undercutting defeater, d, there 
may still be other lines of evidence in support of p (e.g., e2, e3, etc.). In such a case, it’s possible 
that p be reasonably believed on the basis of e2 and e3 despite an agent losing the evidential 
support from e.
14Dougherty, “Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism” 
and “Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning.”
15Dougherty, “Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Rea-
soning,” 25.
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of on-balance justification (e.g., ≈ .51). In other words, Dougherty suggests 
that we should allow for a sort of partial evidential defeat,16 even when we 
are on-balance justified in believing the relevant proposition. To put this 
more formally, dpartial will partially undermine the evidential support relation 
between e and p just when the following are both truth for some agent:
(i) Pr[p|e & dpartial] < Pr[p|e], and
(ii) Pr[p|e & dpartial] > Pr[p]17
That is, for Dougherty, we will have a partially undercutting defeater 
just in case an agent’s credence for p given the evidence and relevant de-
feater falls (i) below their credence for p given merely the evidence and (ii) 
above their credence for p on background knowledge alone.
If we allow that ST might be an undercutting defeater fitting this 
description, it is worth asking whether it can be demonstrated that the 
probabilistic relations holding between O, P1, and ST might allow for an 
agent to be on-balance justified in believing ST while also providing on-
balance support in believing P1 given O. If we begin with the following 
instance of the Theorem of Total Probability18 (Step 1 of the proof below), 
the answer is, demonstrably, yes:
Key Terms
O: that evil seems gratuitous.
P1: that evil is gratuitous.
ST: human agents simply are not in a position to determine how likely 
or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently gratuitous evil is 
actually gratuitous.
Proof
1. Pr[P1|O] = Pr[P1|ST & O]Pr[ST|O] + Pr[P1|¬ST & O]Pr[¬ST|O]
16An anonymous referee helpfully pointed out that the text above might be misleading 
concerning Matheson’s views on partial undercutting defeaters. It’s not that there are no such 
defeaters on Matheson’s account, but rather, that whenever the credence one assigns to such 
a defeater is on-balance justified (i.e., Pr[p] > .5), then it will be a fully undercutting defeater. 
Dougherty’s account, then, differs insofar as he allows for partial defeat with on-balance 
justified propositions.
17When commenting on an earlier version of this paper, Glenn Ross suggested that the 
core problem in this debate is to be found in the “attempt to export a theory of defeat from a 
traditional epistemology of defeasible reasoning as rational changes in full belief to a Bayesian 
epistemology of partial belief revision by conditionalization.” In the end, I believe my posi-
tion is in accordance with this spirit insofar as I take evidential undercutting defeaters to 
undermine the strength of one’s evidence rather than some sort of degree of belief. Closure 
of inquiry defeaters, on the other hand, arise out of an epistemology of belief rather than an 
understanding of the formal nature of evidence. This type of defeater is introduced in §4.
18I am following Dougherty, “Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skep-
tical Theism,” 336–8, very closely. In fact, I follow him exactly here with the mere exception 
of changing a few of the probability assignments and substituting “P1” for his “G” and “ST” 
for his “S.”
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Now assume that the truth of ST renders O evidentially irrelevant to P1, 
such that Pr[P1|ST & O] becomes simply Pr[P1]. Moreover also assume, 
which seems reasonable, that the probability of ST is independent of O, 
such that Pr[ST|O] simply equals Pr[ST]. In this case, we can simplify the 
theorem to the following:
2. Pr[P1|O] = Pr[P1]Pr[ST] + Pr[P1|¬ST & O]Pr[¬ST]
Next, assuming (i) that apparently gratuitous evils very likely are gratu-
itous on the supposition of ¬ST (ii) that the prior probability of P1 can 
reasonably be set at .5 via an assumption of the principle of indifference,19 
and (iii) that reasonable agents might assign credences of .6 to ST20—we get
3. Pr[P1|O] = (.5)(.6) + (.95)(.4) = .3 + .38 = .68
Thus, claims Dougherty, it is demonstrably false that anytime someone 
is on-balance justified in believing ST, they will not be on-balance justified 
in believing P1 given O. Why? Because the above probability assign-
ments describe a possible and coherent probability function for the theses 
under question, and that probability function represents someone who is 
on-balance justified in believing ST while they further remain on-balance 
justified in believing P1 given O. However, while victory seems close at 
hand for Dougherty, I believe Matheson’s contention can be exonerated 
if we consider an assumption underlying this entire debate; namely, that 
while ST is intended to function as an undercutting defeater, it need not be 
a defeater of the support relation. Such defeaters are evidential in nature, 
and I believe that Dougherty is correct to think that a theory of eviden-
tial defeaters ought to admit of partial defeat. However, I also claim that 
there are non-evidential, but still epistemic, defeaters and that, in most 
instances, ST functions as just such a defeater. In the next section, we see 
how non-evidential epistemic defeaters might provide an alternative path 
to roughly the same results at which Matheson originally aimed.
4. A Conciliatory Suggestion: Closure of Inquiry Defeaters
At this point, it is helpful to note a particularly important feature con-
cerning undercutting defeaters; namely this: they are meta-evidential in 
character. That is, an undercutting defeater provides us with a reason to 
doubt the quality of our evidence in some respect. In the case of full evi-
dential defeat, our evidence is shown to no longer connect to the world at 
all in the way we originally thought. In the case of partial evidential defeat, 
19For discussion of the principle of indifference, see Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justifi-
cation, ch. 4. Mark Murphy also pointed out to me that invoking the principle of indifference 
here is a bit tricky, and plausibly, could use an argument for justification. I think he’s prob-
ably right about this. However, since I’m following Dougherty’s version of this argument and 
he invokes indifference, I’ve opted to forgo a defense of invoking the principle. Moreover, 
establishing my thesis that ST can function as a closure of inquiry defeater, rather than as 
an evidential support relation defeater, doesn’t necessitate that I fix this difficulty with the 
principle of indifference. Or at least, so it seems to me.
20And of course, any subjectivist Bayesian would be friendly to such an assignment.
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on the other hand, we simply recalibrate the degree to which we take our 
evidence to support the proposition under question.
Why, however, must we assume that meta-evidential defeaters of 
this sort can affect the evidential support relation only in the two ways 
we’ve already discussed (i.e., as partially or fully undermining evidential 
support relation defeaters)? If in fact there are other types of epistemic 
defeaters that are meta-evidential in character, then perhaps ST could 
function as such a defeater. I submit that this is often the case.
The sort of defeater I have in mind is a closure of inquiry defeater.21 Such 
defeaters, on my view, do not affect the evidential support relation at all 
qua closure of inquiry defeater. Rather, they defeat the reasonability of 
believing some target proposition on the basis of one’s evidence, no matter 
how strong or compelling the evidence. Consider once again Matheson’s il-
lustration from §2. There we supposed that Smith had been accused of a 
crime and, moreover, that the following were true of you as a member of 
the jury:
(a) you were aware of some, but not all, of the evidence against Smith,
(b) Smith very strongly seemed guilty when you considered that evi-
dence, and
(c) you thought it more probable than not that your evidence was 
qualitatively bad in the following respect: it was as likely representa-
tive as it was unrepresentative of all the evidence there was concerning 
Smith’s guilt. 
Matheson claimed that (c) served as a fully undercutting support relation 
defeater for the connection between your evidence (i.e., (a) and (b)) and 
the proposition that Smith was guilty. However, suppose we acknowledge 
Dougherty’s point that the evidential undercutting power of (c) ought to 
diminish as our confidence in (c)’s truth diminishes. In such a case, then 
someone in this situation could reasonably believe that Smith was guilty 
even if they assigned a credence greater than .5 to the truth of (c). Indeed, 
this was the upshot of the probabilistic proof in the previous section.
However, as it seems to me, while Dougherty is correct concerning how 
one should judge the strength of the evidential support relation under 
consideration, he is mistaken to think that someone could reasonably be-
lieve that Smith is guilty merely on the basis of having a sufficiently high 
credence after undergoing a Bayesian-style update on the evidence and 
putative defeater. The reason he is mistaken is that the truth of (c) in this 
instance might provide, in addition to some modicum of evidential defeat, 
a closure of inquiry defeater. In that case, regardless of the strength of the 
agent’s evidence, she cannot, so long as a closure of inquiry defeater is 
21See Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, 115–119 for a brief discussion concerning closure 
of inquiry undercutting defeaters and the epistemology of testimony/disagreement. I owe 
much of my understanding of epistemic defeat to Kvanvig’s work.
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present, reasonably believe that Smith is guilty. Rather, in order to move to 
a state of reasonable belief that Smith is guilty, she will need some further 
reason, due either to subsequent reflection concerning her own trustwor-
thiness in evaluating evidence or to additional evidence gathering, to close 
off inquiry. Thus, the presence of a closure of inquiry defeater prohibits an 
agent from moving from evidence that some proposition is true to reason-
able belief in that proposition.
However, even if we acknowledge that closure of inquiry defeaters are 
sometimes present in deliberative contexts, we need further reason to 
think they might arise in the case of skeptical theism. Consequently, in the 
next section we consider two ways in which closure of inquiry defeaters 
might arise for an agent and determine whether either of these conditions 
for closure of inquiry defeat accurately describe the context concerning ST.
5. Motivating Closure of Inquiry: The Gathering and Evaluation of Evidence
Two features of a situation that tend to give rise to closure of inquiry defeat 
are (i) the expectation that further evidence gathering will lead to eviden-
tially significant discoveries concerning what one should believe and (ii) a 
live or momentous realization that one may not be reliable or trustworthy 
when it comes to assessing the significance of evidence within a particular 
domain of inquiry. Let us consider each of these features in turn, begin-
ning with an example to illustrate closure of inquiry defeat due to the 
need to engage in further evidence-gathering.
The Need for Further Evidence Gathering: The Lottery Paradox and  
Closure of Inquiry
Suppose an agent S knows that she has a ticket in a fair one-million ticket 
lottery. Thus, she believes that the probability that her ticket will win is 
1/106. If there is a threshold for how probable a proposition must be (on 
one’s background knowledge) before one may reasonably believe it, then 
S’s belief that her ticket will lose surely surpasses that threshold easily (i.e., 
it has a probability of .999999). However, if S proceeds to believe that her 
ticket will lose, then she should go on to do a number of other things, such 
as give away her ticket or ignore the announcement of the winning num-
bers from the news that evening. But many such persons do not perform 
these actions, and importantly, no one thinks not performing these actions 
is unreasonable or revealing of an underlying epistemic malady within 
the agent’s cognitive system. But if S does not throw away her ticket, it 
seems to reveal that she does not believe her ticket will lose, for a losing 
ticket has no value for ordinary people, and S is not treating this ticket as 
if she believed it had no value. Rather, she treats her ticket in accordance 
with a belief that it will probably lose (i.e., a type of ticket that has some 
value, even if only very little). Thus, the live chance that her ticket is a 
winner prevents her from reasonably closing off inquiry, believing that it’s 
a loser, and acting accordingly.
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Now suppose rationality required that S believe her ticket would lose, 
contrary to the previous paragraph’s contention, due to her ticket’s ex-
ceedingly high probability of being a loser. Next consider the reasoning S 
would give in support of this belief. S would cite the extreme likelihood 
of her ticket losing, and on this basis, form the belief that her ticket would 
lose. But this same reasoning would equally support her forming the be-
lief of any ticket in the lottery that it would lose. And so, a principle of 
the form whenever one believes that p is extremely probable one ought to form 
the belief that p would allow for the rational acceptability of someone who 
believes of each ticket in the lottery that it will lose and, what is more 
troubling, a proposition with which the first set of beliefs is inconsistent; 
namely, that some ticket will win.22 This implication (i.e., that the reason-
able set of propositions to believe in some cases will form an inconsistent 
set) may or may not turn out to be as implausible as it seems at first blush, 
but briefly analyzing the paradox will enable us to see some implications 
for rationality and the debate concerning skeptical theism’s evidential sig-
nificance outlined above.
In short, the lottery context forces us to reconsider the following question:
Under what circumstances is it reasonable to believe p given that one 
reasonably believes that p is probable (or highly probable)?
At least one reasonable response to this question is this: person S can 
reasonably believe p on the basis of her highly confirmatory evidence that 
p is true when she no longer expects further evidence gathering to signifi-
cantly affect what would be rational for her to believe. In the case of the 
lottery, S knows there is at least one ticket in the lottery that will win, and 
for all she knows, she is holding that ticket. To determine whether or not 
she is in fact holding a winner, all she needs to do is engage in a further 
bit of evidence gathering by checking the numbers on her ticket against 
the numbers announced on the nightly news. And so, her reasonable ex-
pectation that further evidence gathering could alter what proposition her 
evidence supports gives her a closure of inquiry defeater that leaves her 
evidence entirely unchanged but nevertheless prevents her from reason-
ably believing that her ticket is a loser.23
If we apply this to the case of skeptical theism, then, we have the fol-
lowing: person S can reasonably believe that there is gratuitous evil on the 
basis of the world’s seeming to contain gratuitous evil only when she no longer 
expects further evidence gathering concerning the question of whether 
22For it can be simply stipulated that she knows that there’s one ticket that wins out of 
the million.
23As an anonymous referee has suggested, it is worth pointing out that I’m aware my 
proposed solution to the lottery paradox is controversial; however, in any case, it still suffices 
to explain this particular way in which someone might acquire a closure of inquiry defeater. 
Consequently, even if I’m wrong about the lottery paradox, so long as there are cases where 
further evidence gathering is expected by an agent to improve his or her evidence in signifi-
cant ways, closure of inquiry defeaters will remain relevant.
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there is gratuitous evil to significantly affect the reasonability of the propo-
sition her evidence currently supports. That is, if S does not expect to learn 
anything new by continuing to gather evidence, then she will be able to 
reasonably believe there are gratuitous evils on the basis of her experience of 
apparent gratuitous evil. But importantly, until she reaches such a point, she 
will not be able to reasonably believe that there are gratuitous evils.
Objection. Someone might worry that in the case of skeptical theism 
there is simply no further evidence gathering at all that would result in 
learning something new about what the total evidence available supports. 
While I’m not convinced this is true, I am willing to concede the objection 
as likely accurate for most people faced with the question of whether there 
is gratuitous evil in the world. As a result, if most people find themselves 
thinking that it is highly unlikely that further evidence gathering would 
result in any new information of evidential significance, then they will 
not have any sort of closure of inquiry defeat. And consequently, they will 
be able to reasonably believe that there is gratuitous evil, even if they think 
ST is on-balance probable. However, the second way in which someone 
might acquire a closure of inquiry defeater is, I think, much more difficult 
to avoid in the case of skeptical theism.
Disagreement: The Undermining of Epistemic Self-Trust and  
Closure of Inquiry Defeat
The notion of epistemic self-trust has become a popular topic in epis-
temology as of late24 and though I cannot address the importance of 
epistemic self-trust in full detail here, I aim to say enough to demonstrate 
its relevance to the question at hand. Importantly, one’s degree of epis-
temic self-trust plays a vital role in understanding the phenomenon of 
epistemic disagreement. In particular, when two individuals disagree 
about some proposition but additionally take each other to be epistemic 
peers, they find themselves faced with a dilemma between continuing to 
trust their own assessment of the evidence or to defer to their interlocutor. 
Thus the object of defeat in such cases is not really an agent’s evidence, but 
rather, an agent’s degree of epistemic self-trust.25
Let us begin, then, with a straightforward example of epistemic dis-
agreement:
You and a colleague decide to go to lunch to discuss some departmental 
policies. Additionally, you agree to split the lunch bill in half rather than 
worry about the precise costs of each person’s meal in order to make 
things simpler. Unfortunately, when you and your colleague calculate 
the amount owed by each person, you come to different conclusions. 
You say, “It looks like we both owe $12.48,” but your colleague demurs 
24See, for instance, Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority; Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in One-
self and Others; and Alston, Beyond Justification.
25I’m fully aware that this is a controversial claim. However, I attempt to demonstrate that 
this claim is true via example in what’s to follow.
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and claims instead that you both owe $12.58. What should you believe, 
and what is your evidence, once you’ve realized there’s disagreement 
over the owed lunch bill amount?26
To some extent, of course, this case is under-described, for perhaps you 
have many colleagues given to deceiving you about lunch bill costs, in 
which case, you should dismiss their disagreement as misleading. But let 
us stipulate that you and your colleague are equally competent and thor-
ough when it comes to basic arithmetic as well as unwavering champions 
of honesty in scenarios such as the one above. Moreover, suppose you are 
aware of these facts and are aware that they accurately describe your col-
league as well. Given these stipulations, (i) what is your evidence that you 
owe $12.48, and (ii) what should you believe on the basis of that evidence 
given that your colleague disagrees with you?
Concerning the question about the content of your evidence, there are 
two reasonable responses. The first response is this: the evidence you have 
is precisely what it was prior to hearing about the contrary conclusion of 
your colleague. It consists of a perceptual experience of your lunch receipt, 
your memory of the itemized dollar amounts which you added together 
yourself, etc.27 And importantly, in this instance, given that your evidence 
has not changed in content, then it presumably supports (evidentially) the 
proposition that you owe $12.48 to precisely the same degree it did prior 
to hearing your colleague’s disagreement. In other words, whatever sort 
of defeater disagreement cases of this sort involve, that defeater is neither 
a fully nor a partially undercutting evidential defeater, for the evidence 
hasn’t changed. The second plausible response to the question about the 
content of your evidence after hearing from your colleague is this: your 
colleague’s utterance does give you evidence; namely, it gives you evidence 
that the proposition previously supported by your evidence (i.e., that you 
owe $12.48) is false. However, given either of these responses to the first 
question—i.e., that the content of your evidence is unchanged or that it 
is changed only slightly—the same answer applies to the question con-
cerning how to respond to your evidence.
That answer is this: surely it would be rational for you to withhold your 
belief that you owe $12.48 for the lunch bill. But the reason withholding 
would be appropriate on the basis of your evidence after confronting dis-
agreement when it was not appropriate before confronting disagreement is 
that despite whatever the evidential content, the quality of your evaluation 
of the evidence (or rather, what you’ve made of the evidence28) has been 
26See David Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement,” 196 for a similar case, which 
is quoted in Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, 114. The upshot of the case is much closer to 
Kvanvig’s position than Christensen’s. I differ, however, by distinguishing between types of 
closure of inquiry defeat and identifying the object of defeat here.
27Or if we’re more careful, your evidence consists fundamentally in the propositions en-
coded by such mental states as those listed above.
28See Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, ch. 4 for this banner-like way of putting the point.
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called into question. That is, in light of the disagreement, you have a reason 
to doubt that you have accurately assessed the implications of the evidence 
in your possession, and thus, you cannot responsibly believe that you owe 
$12.48 on the basis of your earlier evaluation of the evidence.
So what must you do in this case to close off inquiry properly and go on 
to believe whichever proposition is supported by your evidence after sub-
sequent reflection? Because you trust that your colleague is as reliable as 
you are in basic arithmetic, you reassess the evidence in your possession. 
You look to see if you forgot to carry the one when adding your bill, and 
then, your next belief will depend on what you learn when reassessing 
the evidence. Suppose, for instance, that you come to the same conclu-
sion as you did before the disagreement; that is, suppose you still come 
to a total lunch bill of $12.48, rather than $12.58. At that point, closure 
of inquiry will be permissible precisely because you will have vindicated 
your original assessment of the evidence. Or in other words, you will have 
successfully demonstrated your trustworthiness in that instance as a reli-
able arithmetician.
But let us reflect yet more carefully on this case. As I mentioned earlier, 
epistemic self-trust has become central in many epistemological disputes, 
especially in cases of epistemic disagreement. One reason, among many, 
that epistemic self-trust is so important is that it can serve as the object 
of defeat. Indeed, for many philosophers, the reason closure of inquiry 
defeaters are dismissed is that closure of inquiry defeaters do not seem 
to exist in the first place. Proponents of this sort of view might argue, for 
instance, that for there to be a type of epistemic defeater, there must also 
be an object of defeat appropriately related to the epistemic realm. But the 
only obvious object of epistemic defeat available, so these philosophers 
might allege, is evidence. Therefore, there are no non-evidential epistemic 
defeaters. As a result of such an argument, this blind spot to non-evidential 
objects of epistemic defeat produces an additional blind spot to the plau-
sibility and presence of closure of inquiry defeaters.
What we have in this case, then, is an example of non-evidential defeat, 
and we know that some such defeat is in play since a reasonable change 
from belief to withholding concerning the proposition that you owe $12.48 
is present without a significant corresponding change in the evidence. 
Contrary to the argument of the previous paragraph, moreover, it does 
not seem obvious to me at all that the only available object of defeat in 
such cases is evidence. Rather, as this case of disagreement, and many 
other cases besides, surely shows, our degree of epistemic self-trust can 
become the target of defeat, and whenever this happens, the type of de-
feater involved prevents the propriety of closing off inquiry concerning 
the proposition under question. And this may take place, even if the evi-
dence one has seems compelling from the first-person perspective.
In summary, then, there are two potential sources for closure of inquiry 
defeat. In the first instance, whenever we have a reasonable expectation 
that engaging in future evidence gathering practices could reveal a piece 
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of significant evidence regarding what proposition we should believe, 
then we may be faced with a closure of inquiry defeater. This is, argu-
ably, the sort of defeater in play when considering the lottery paradox. 
In the second instance, whenever one’s degree of epistemic self-trust is 
threatened, whether by disagreement or by some other source (e.g., when 
confronting the ways in which heuristics warp judgments of various 
sorts29), then one may again face closure of inquiry defeat. Such defeat can 
be fended off by either (i) completing whatever further evidence gathering 
is necessary or (ii) reflectively reevaluating one’s epistemic self in light 
of the defeat. But until subsequent evidence gathering and/or reflection 
occurs, closure of inquiry will not be rationally permissible.
Closure of Inquiry and Skeptical Theism
Let us, then, return to the puzzle faced earlier concerning the defeating 
power of skeptical theism, and recall again the theses with which we are 
concerned:
O: That evil seems gratuitous.
P1: That evil is gratuitous.
ST: Human agents simply are not in a position to determine how likely 
or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently gratuitous evil is 
actually gratuitous.
By the end of §3, we saw that evidential defeat comes in degrees, such 
that even when an agent finds herself assigning a credence greater than .5 
to ST, she can nevertheless rationally assign a credence greater than .5 to 
P1 on the basis of O as well. That is, for such an agent, belief in ST is insuf-
ficient to defeat belief in the existence of gratuitous evil. But as we have 
just seen in the previous section, ST need not function as a mere evidential 
defeater. It is possible, even plausible, that ST functions additionally as a 
defeater for closure of inquiry. Why is this the case? Consider the second 
source of closure of inquiry defeat.
According to the second source of closure of inquiry defeat described 
above, anytime one has a reason to doubt one’s degree of epistemic self-
trust with respect to assessing the significance of evidence in a particular 
domain, then one has a defeater for closure of inquiry. Consider ST, which 
states that the epistemic position from which we acquire our evidence con-
cerning the existence of gratuitous evil is highly unreliable. In other words, 
if ST is to be believed, both the evidence we have gathered concerning gra-
tuitous evil and our ability to assess its implications for the way the world 
is are radically deficient. Thus, so long as we find ourselves assigning a 
credence of .51 or higher to the truth of ST, it seems likely that we are faced 
with, in addition to whatever evidential defeaters are in play, a closure of 
29For an accessible and well-written introduction to several of the relevant heuristics and 
biases I have in mind, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow.
31COMMONSENSE, SKEPTICAL THEISM, AND CLOSURE OF INQUIRY DEFEAT
inquiry defeater concerning the reasonability of believing P1 on the basis 
of O. Thus, even if O is strong evidence for P1 from the perspective of 
some individual, they may nevertheless be irrational if they believe P1 on 
the basis of O, for to admit of rationality here would betray a lack of ap-
preciation for the importance of non-evidential, but still epistemic, defeat.
Conclusion
I have argued that the thesis of skeptical theism provides not only an 
evidential undercutting defeater for belief in the existence of gratuitous 
evil but a closure of inquiry defeater as well. As a result, even though 
Dougherty is correct to allow that ST might only admit of partial evidential 
defeat (contra Matheson), and that even after accounting for such defeat 
a rational agent could have evidence which on the whole supports the 
proposition that there are gratuitous evils, it does not follow that such an 
agent can rationally believe in the existence of gratuitous evils. For such an 
agent has a compelling reason to distrust her ability to assess the evidence 
concerning the evidential argument from evil, a reason which prohibits 
her from closing off inquiry.30
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